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Equity in Assessment: Discrimination and Disability Issues from an 





Assessment equity concerns all educational authorities and practitioners. When educators 
consider issues of equity, their predominant concern is accommodation of students with 
special needs, cultural issues, and creating alternative assessment activities that have 
equivalence to standard activities, so as not to advantage or disadvantage any student in 
their demonstration of knowledge. This paper examines equity issues in assessment from a 
legal perspective, drawing on case history from Australia, and based in discrimination and 
disability law. The paper is intended to assist authorities and practitioners to understand 
legal implications of educational assessment in order to promote practices that reduce the 
likelihood of legal claims and the resultant use of financial and human resources away from 
educational activities. However, the discussion of cases and judgements is also intended to 
raise issues of whether educational providers and authorities should be more conscionable 
in their consideration of educational equity and assessment. 
 
Introduction 
The natural meaning of ‘equity’, as defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,1 is: 
the quality of being equal or fair; impartiality; even-handed dealing. 
For educators, equity in assessment is necessary to ensure students are not advantaged or 
disadvantaged in demonstrating their achievement, whether on the basis of meeting 
established achievement standards, or in comparison to other students. Advantage or 
disadvantage is posited to occur if, for the assessment purpose or context, assessment 
requirements inappropriately favour, or are biased towards, specific cultural knowledge, 
including gendered knowledge. 
Fundamental to equity in assessment is the recognition that the construction of the 
knowledge and skills to be assessed should involve a critical evaluation of the extent to 
which the choice of a particular set of knowledge and skills is likely to privilege certain 
groups of students and exclude others by virtue of gender, socioeconomic, cultural or 
linguistic background. A concern with equity also leads to adopting a proactive stance on 
the appropriate representation in the curriculum of different kinds of cultural knowledge 
and experience as valued knowledge and skills.2  
Advantage or disadvantage also occurs when standard assessment conditions and 
administration prevent students with a special learning need or disability from being able to 
demonstrate their learning achievement, where students without such needs or disabilities 
will not be so hampered. It is established educational practice that alternative forms of 
assessment, accommodations or access should be provided for students who would be 
disadvantaged if required to demonstrate their achievement by standard forms of 
assessment. In most nations, classifications have been developed to guide such 
amendments to assessment type, form or administration. For example, special assessment 
adjustments may need to be provided for: 
 students with impairments that have a physiological basis, such as those involving 
sensory, motor or neurological factors; 
 students with educational needs arising primarily from socio-economic, cultural and/or 
linguistic factors where there may be some form of educational disadvantage including 
students: 
 
 • of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander backgrounds 
 
 • with language backgrounds other than English 
 
 • who are migrants or refugees 
 
 • from rural and remote locations 
 
 • in low socioeconomic circumstances; 
 
 students with difficulties in accessing learning which do not appear to be directly or 
primarily attributable to educational disadvantage arising from impairment or to 
socioeconomic, cultural and/or linguistic factors; 
 students with identifiably different patterns of educational development and 
orientation, influenced by factors such as: 
 
 
 • gender 
 
 • special talents (including giftedness).3  
 
In England, guidelines for appropriate assessment forms for the Key Stage Assessments use 
a more constructive term, from the student's perspective, of ‘access arrangements’, rather 
than the deficit-defined term used in Australia and the United States of America (United 
States) of ‘accommodations’. The English guidelines indicate that such assessments are 
intended to assess ‘children's ability in a fair and comparable way’. 
It is not possible to provide specific rules governing the use of adaptations because of the 
wide range of children's needs and circumstances. Teachers should use their knowledge of 
individual children in deciding which adaptations to make, bearing in mind the nature and 
level of support that these children receive as part of the normal classroom practice.4  
Children who may need access arrangements include those with special needs, children 
whose learning difficulty or disability ‘significantly affects access to the tests’, children 
unable to sit and work for a sustained period because ‘of a disability or behavioural, 
emotional or social difficulties’, and children with limited fluency in English.5 Recent policy 
developments in Australia have similarly moved to a consideration of equity that addresses 
diversity in student backgrounds and conditions as a continuous variable, including the need 
to recognise diversity within and among groups (emphasis added), rather than as a 
categorical and labelled student condition.6  
While the above statements draw on educational policy, provision of forms of assessment 
appropriate to student circumstances has also been written into law. In Australia, recently 
established federal law, the Disability Standards for Education, states very clearly that, in 
respect of students with disabilities: 
[m]easures that the education provider may implement to enable the student to participate 
in the learning experiences (including the assessment and certification requirements) of the 
course or program, and any relevant supplementary course or program, on the same basis 
as a student without a disability, include measures ensuring that: 
 …  the assessment and certification requirements for the course or program are 
appropriate to the needs of the student and accessible to him or her; and … 
 the assessment procedures and methodologies for the course or program are adapted 
to enable the student to demonstrate the knowledge, skills or competencies being 
assessed.7  
In the United States, a major purpose of the national educational accountability legislation 
No Child Left Behind 8 was to ensure that all students, including students with disabilities, 
would be included in educational goal-setting and reporting—leading to substantial and 
ongoing reconsideration of the meaning of ‘equivalence’ in terms of assessment. More 
generally in the United States, s.504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of disability in programmes that receive federal financial 
support. Determination of eligibility under s.504 is to be established by initial and continuing 
evaluations, where test and other evaluation materials: 
are selected and administered so as to best ensure that, when a test is administered to a 
student with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect 
the student's aptitude or achievement level or whatever other factor the test purports to 
measure, rather than reflecting the student's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills 
(except where those skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).9  
Legal challenges in the United States regarding the adequacy of educational provision for 
students with disabilities are plentiful, and often successful for the student plaintiffs. More 
generally, worldwide, students and their families, or schools,10 who believe that an inequity 
in assessment has occurred to the disadvantage of a student or school, are resorting to the 
courts to seek an equitable outcome, when internal administrative procedures have been 
exhausted. Indeed, the dictionary definition of equity previously cited includes: 
the recourse to general principles of justice to correct or supplement the ordinary law. 
However, the law provides recourse to challenges of equity in educational assessment on 
the basis of more considerations of equity than the disability and discrimination grounds 
established by the various legislation and the guidelines discussed above. Challenges on 
these other grounds and sources of law, including challenges relating to discrimination but 
argued on different principles, are discussed elsewhere.11 The focus of this paper is legal 
challenges regarding equity in assessment that have occurred on the basis of discrimination, 
in many cases due to student disability. Such challenges are usually mounted on the basis of 
the failure of an authority or educational institution to provide appropriate access to 
educational opportunity, particularly the opportunity to demonstrate achievement to the 
extent available to others who are not so disabled. 
The following discussion draws on Australian caselaw, where equity claims are usually 
mounted under anti-discrimination acts or via the mechanism of judicial review of decisions 
where it is claimed educational authorities have failed to take into account relevant 
considerations relating to a student's special needs. Grounds for consideration of 
discrimination in England are similar to the grounds in Australia, due both to the evolution 
of our legal contexts from English models, and the establishment of such statutory 
governance. In the United States, the Constitutional Amendments provide a legal 
framework for discrimination challenges not available in England and Australia. The Equal 
Protection Clause (14th Amendment) has been used successfully in the US to mount equity 
cases in education, particularly in areas such as race and religion, and most notably in Brown 
v Board of Education (Brown I, 347 U.S. 483; Brown II 349 U.S. 294), while cases are also 
raised under subsequent legislation such as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) addressing more specifically issues of provision for students with special needs.12  
The discussion here examines a number of cases in Australian law that involve, directly or 
indirectly, matters of student assessment. Each case considers a different aspect of 
assessment practice that may be challenged to exemplify the range of assessment matters 
that authorities, schools and teachers need to monitor in order to ensure equitable practice. 
Cases involving discrimination are usually addressed first through administrative processes 
and then through Courts or Anti-Discrimination Tribunals. In most of the cases below, the 
matters have escalated to the appeal stage, as the plaintiffs have not been satisfied with the 
response of the primary Tribunals, or have wished to challenge the Tribunal rulings. 
Discrimination, disability in assessment in Australian law 
Australia has a two-tiered system of legislative prohibition of discriminatory conduct. At the 
federal level there are four stand alone acts, each of which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of a particular protected attribute: The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). Each of these acts prohibits discrimination in the area of 
education. In addition, each State and Territory has a multi-purpose act prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of a variety of protected attributes in a variety of protected 
areas. Each State and Territory act prohibits discrimination in the area of education.13  
While educational policy may be moving to recognition of the continuous nature of student 
diversity, rather than categorical attributes, the law has yet to follow. In general, to succeed 
in a legal challenge on the basis of discrimination in Australia (and most nations including 
England and the United States), an individual must be able to identify that they are a 
member of a specific group or class. The protected attributes always include race, sex, 
disability or impairment and age but may also include a diverse range of other attributes 
including, for example, religion, parental status, appearance, sexuality and political activity. 
The legal burden for proof of discrimination 
The common interpretation of discrimination will not necessarily be congruent with a legal 
interpretation and the level of proof needed for a case to succeed in court. Two kinds of 
discrimination are recognised in Australian legislation—direct discrimination and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination generally requires proof that the complainant was 
treated ‘less favourably’ than a student without the student's protected attribute ‘in 
circumstances which are the same or not materially different’.14 Indirect discrimination 
addresses ‘hidden’ institutional discrimination where practices applicable to all have a 
discriminatory effect upon people with a protected attribute. Proof of indirect 
discrimination generally requires proof of the existence of a discriminatory term, 
requirement or condition with which the person with a protected attribute cannot comply 
but with which those without the same protected attribute can comply. It is also necessary 
to prove that the term imposed is ‘not reasonable’.15  
Simple examples illustrate how discrimination might arise in an assessment context. Direct 
discrimination in the administering of a test might happen, for example, if a marker marks a 
student of a particular race, sex or religion ‘harder’ than students not of that race, sex or 
religion. Indirect discrimination might arise in the administering of a test if there were, for 
example, a requirement that all students must complete the test in a set time. Students 
with a disability may not be able to comply with this requirement—they may not be able to 
write quickly, or they may have a processing disorder. Students without disability can 
comply. The term is not reasonable. 
Each Australian legislative scheme recognises that there will be instances where 
discrimination will not be unlawful. This is clear in the definition of indirect discrimination in 
that it is necessary to show that the term or requirement imposed is ‘not reasonable’ before 
it will be held to cause unlawful discrimination. A scheme of exemptions is also created 
within the legislation to recognise circumstances where it is inappropriate to prohibit a 
prima facie discriminatory activity. 
Equity, assessment and accommodations for special needs 
The provision of accommodations for assessments and examinations is clearly an example 
to ensure that indirect discrimination does not occur. However, the authorities and teachers 
usually determine the nature of the accommodation that will be provided. 
A student may challenge the validity of examination results affected by a failure to make 
appropriate accommodation and seek compensation. In perhaps the most straightforward 
Australian case on point, Bishop v Sports Massage Training School ([2000] HREOC No 
H99/55), for example, the complainant, a tertiary student who had dyslexia, narrowly failed 
a written examination causing him ‘a delay in his career and a significant loss of self-esteem’ 
(Bishop [1]). The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) found that the 
complainant had been the victim of indirect discrimination in that the respondent ‘required 
[him] to complete the examination in the same two-hour period as the other, able-bodied 
students’. HREOC found further that ‘[t]here [was] a real chance that had [the complainant] 
been given an extra half-hour, or had the examination been conducted orally in his case, he 
would have passed’ (Bishop [1]). The complainant was awarded $3,000 damages to 
compensate him for losses including the cost of relocating to another massage school where 
his disability was properly accommodated (Bishop [1]). 
A more complex case, BI v Board of Studies (BI) ([2000] NSWSC 921),16 demonstrates that a 
student with special needs who believes the accommodation is not sufficient or appropriate 
may seek court intervention to make different conditions available. In BI, a student with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) brought an application for judicial review of 
the decisions of the New South Wales Board of Studies which related to the provisions 
made for him to complete his Higher School Certificate (HSC) examinations. His medical 
expert advised that ‘he ha[d] great difficulty starting to work and that he work[ed] at a very 
slow pace’ (BI [34]), while the medical certification submitted for special considerations for 
the examinations indicated that his circumstances meant ‘poor concentration and poor 
sequencing skills; impair(ed) ability to read questions in examinations; impair(ed) ability to 
plan answers to questions; impair(ed) ability to check answers’. It was indicated that he 
required extra time to compensate for his difficulties, and that without extra time ‘he would 
be unable to demonstrate his knowledge’ (BI [5]). 
Guidelines for schools and students on applying for special arrangements for the HSC are 
clearly stated by the NSW Board of Studies.17 Rest breaks and extra time were two 
categories of special provisions available in the system, and had been incorporated into 
policy in response to the practice that had developed over time of providing this 
accommodation to such students. In accordance with this recently developed policy, BI was 
granted rest breaks but not extra time. The student requested a review of this provision, 
arguing, with medical support, that taking such breaks worsened his condition as he took a 
long time to get restarted on such activities. He eventually sought court injunctions that he 
should be allowed extra time, with the hearings accelerated so that judgement could occur 
prior to the examinations. The arguments made on his behalf were that the conditions had 
been applied inflexibly and did not take appropriate consideration of his condition. 
However, as part of the policy, the student had been required to complete some pretests 
that showed that he could write at an acceptable speed and had an appropriate reading 
level. The student challenged the policy and its development, and, in the alternative, argued 
that it had been inflexibly applied in his case. 
On the basis of the information provided on reading and writing skill assessments, evidence 
was presented that to give the student extra time ‘would potentially advantage him’ against 
his peers (BI [52]). The court noted: 
The evidence disclosed that the Board approves the provision of extra time to students 
whose ability to read or to write is functionally affected. Students with severe physical 
disabilities such as cerebral palsy or juvenile arthritis may be eligible for extra time. Students 
who use the services of a writer may be granted extra time to take into account the 
dictation process. … The provision of rest breaks is granted to students who have 
demonstrated difficulties with concentration and focusing. (BI [8]-[9]) 
and found: 
To my mind the submission that the Board's policy was applied inflexibly with respect to the 
plaintiff is not made out. I consider the evidence shows that the Board, through its delegate 
Ms Speers, demonstrated a willingness to reconsider the plaintiff's application (described as 
a ‘re-appeal’) on its merits. … I find that Ms Speers had regard to the individual merits of the 
application in making her determination. (BI [56]) 
In other words, when a policy is in place, an organisation can show that it has applied due 
and thoughtful consideration to issues of accommodation, and the nature of 
accommodation is made on the basis of the policy, reasonable judgement, and not the 
convenience of the examiner; legal challenges are unlikely to succeed. In this case, the 
plaintiff, BI, was required to pay most of the costs of the defendant as well as his own costs. 
Two interesting aspects of this assessment challenge emerge from an educational 
consideration of equity. Firstly, prior to the development of the policy regarding 
arrangements for students with attention-deficit disorders, it appeared that each case was 
considered on its merits, with the usual accommodation offered to students being rest 
breaks, hence the development of the policy. If a policy guideline regarding specific 
treatment of a student with ADD/ADHD had not existed, BI may have prevailed in his 
request, given his medical support. 
The second issue is that the student's claim for a special accommodation was disallowed as 
the functional reading and writing tests used to consider the extent of his disability, as 
guided by the policy on accommodations, indicated that he could perform within a ‘normal 
range’ (BI [32]). The plaintiff indicated that these results indicated his ‘intellectual capacity’ 
to perform at such a level given his condition (BI [41]). The defendant considered that to 
offer extra time would potentially advantage the plaintiff in comparison to his peers (BI 
[52]). Thus it would appear that through the use of such policy guidelines to determine what 
is fair, students with disabilities may only receive accommodations that allow them to 
achieve a ‘normal’ standard, not accommodations that could allow them to fully 
demonstrate superior achievement. As a later case demonstrates, both educators and the 
courts are not comfortable with a duality of impairment and academic excellence, 
preferring models of dealing with educational equity and disability that focus on bridging a 
deficit gap to apparent normality. 
Assessment equity and student social and emotional needs 
One of the arguments made in BI, when considering availability of accommodations and 
equity principles, was that the HSC ‘tests ability on the day of the examination to complete 
the examination. It is essential that as far as practicable the same criteria and requirements 
are provided to all candidates’ (BI [28]). Principles of quality assessment indicate that a 
variety of assessment activities should be undertaken to inform high stakes assessments. 
Most national assessment systems now incorporate information gained through multiple 
pieces of assessment over time, not just a result from a single examination. 
Principles of good assessments also advocate that a range of assessment formats should be 
used, including group work and self and peer assessments, to promote quality and engaged 
learning.18 However, such approaches will not necessarily provide equity in assessment, 
given the issues of their suitability for students with social-emotional disability as raised in 
BI, even when such forms of assessment are being used for assessments that are not high-
stakes certification. 
Although case authority on student challenges to such approaches does not exist in school 
education, it is worth considering one challenge that occurred in the Technical and Further 
Education sector (TAFE) in Australia, a case that reinforces the care needed not just for 
consideration of equitable assessment for students with physical or neurological disorders, 
but also for assessment of students with social and emotional disorders.19  
In Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission ([2003] NSWADT 22),20 the student alleged 14 
acts of discriminatory treatment by the TAFE College he attended, under the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). The complaints were dismissed by the New South Wales 
(NSW) Administrative Decisions Tribunal on grounds ranging from a deficiency of evidence, 
to a failure to prove that he had been treated less favourably than others without his 
impairment would have been treated in the same circumstances (direct discrimination), to a 
failure to prove that his treatment and not his impairment had caused him detriment. The 
student, Reyes-Gonzalez, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia which resulted in 
problems with meeting schedules and deadlines, problems interacting in groups, and, as a 
result, problems with completing his courses. Medical evidence which detailed the 
significant impact of his impairment on his ability to complete tertiary studies and 
undertake assessments was persuasive: 
His illness, as noted by me and others, would affect his capacity to study at TAFE, this would 
include working in groups. He may be sensitive or over sensitive to peer assessment, 
particularly if others are not aware of his disabilities and do not take those disabilities into 
account. … I would equally expect him to have problems writing examinations, presenting in 
front of a class, doing group projects and being peer assessed. (Reyes-Gonzalez [16]) 
There was also some suggestion that the disability not only impacted his difficulties with 
completing course requirements but also affected his capacity to deal with TAFE personnel 
in relation to his discrimination claims. A major component of his schizophrenia was a 
problem with sleep that impacted on his attendance and behaviour at the TAFE. The student 
did not inform his teachers about the cause of his sleep problem. 
While many of the matters in the dispute could not be established by the student, and 
considerable support appears to have been offered or provided by the TAFE college 
personnel, some of the assessment findings are of interest: 
In some cases teachers allowed him to work alone and on those occasions he would pass 
the subject. There are only a few of the subjects in which this occurred. In the other subjects 
the teachers insisted that the group participation was so essential to the educational 
requirements of the marketing subject that they could not allow the Applicant to work 
alone. In most of those subjects where he was required to work in a group, the Applicant 
either withdrew or he failed. (Reyes-Gonzalez [110]) 
While further assistance was made available on the basis of this, advice also was that such 
forms of assessment addressed valued learning outcomes: 
In the case of marketing, we look for the interactive and interpersonal component as 
learning outcomes of group work. We believe that in marketing they are very important 
attributes that our graduates should have, the capacity to interact and to have interpersonal 
relationships. We think they are critical elements of a successful graduate of marketing and 
that is why there is so much emphasis on group work within the marketing area. (Reyes-
Gonzalez [114]) 
The Tribunal found that considerable assistance had been provided by the TAFE college, 
where appropriate, and that the various claims were unfounded or unproven. The clear 
implication of the decision is that although the complainant's disability appeared 
fundamental to his failure at TAFE, from a legal perspective he had not established grounds 
for discriminatory practice and remedy, and the response of the institution to his situation, 
to the extent to which they were able, was sufficient. 
Student placement 
Assessment outcomes, and diagnosis of student learning needs, including gifted children, 
are a common area of challenge in the United States, and, more recently, in England.21 The 
number of such challenges appears to be increasing in Australia. The challenges can involve 
failure to place a student in an appropriate programme or failure to undertake appropriate 
assessments. In an unusual placement case in Australia, lack of full assessments of student 
learning outcomes and failure to use the latest and fullest information were argued as 
sources of discrimination preventing a young girl's access to an accelerated programme. In 
Malaxetxebarria v Queensland (M1) ([2006] QADT 14), the failure to allow an advanced 
young learner to attend high school was challenged as discrimination on the basis of age, 
under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and damages of $500,000 were sought. The 
complainant argued both direct discrimination, in that she had been treated ‘less 
favourably’ on the basis of age, and indirect discrimination by the imposition of a term on 
her entitlement to education with which she could not comply. The term allegedly imposed 
was ‘the requirement that in order to progress to Year 8, the complainant attain a requisite 
level of social and/or emotional maturity as determined in part by her age’ (M1 [1]). 
Although a specialist assessment indicated the child's reasoning abilities were in the 
‘superior’ to ‘very superior’ range (M1 [11]), the educational authorities in the state 
government department of education considered that M lacked the social maturity to be 
placed with much older students in high school. One aspect of the original case was that the 
mother indicated that M had completed Year 7 learning outcomes successfully at home and 
was suited to accelerated placement in high school. However, the primary school indicated 
that she had only been assessed on Year 6 learning outcomes at school and M's teacher 
suggested that she did not have the social precociousness that would enable her to succeed 
high school (M1 [17]). M's teacher conceded in evidence, however, that he did not ‘have the 
expertise to assess gifted and talented students’ (M1 [16]). At no stage in the Tribunal's 
consideration was it suggested that further academic assessments should have been 
undertaken by the school to prove or disprove the child's preparedness academically for the 
public high school, nor was substantial evidence about the social maturity of the girl 
provided. In this context it is interesting to note that during the course of the Tribunal 
challenge, M commenced at a private high school and completed one semester with good 
grades. 
The original application to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal was dismissed. The initial 
considerations of the Tribunal focused on the decision made by the respondent regarding 
preferable educational options for the nine-year-old M: 
In the circumstances, I consider it was reasonable for the respondent to have taken a 
cautious approach to the acceleration of the complainant. The complainant had only 
attended a State school for three months leading up to the decision. Prior to that time, she 
had been educated at home through the Distance Education program. 
…  [T]he Department did not have an extensive dossier of information available on the 
complainant to assist in the determination of whether it was appropriate for her to progress 
further to a full attendance at Year 8 at Rosewood State High School. The only sources of 
information available to them were the complainant's mother (and family), her teachers at 
the Mutdapilly State School and the independent assessment carried out by Mr Gosschalk. 
Although Mr Griffin (the complainant's teacher) acknowledged he had no specific expertise 
in the area of gifted and talented children, I consider that he gave his assessment of the 
complainant in good faith and with her interests in mind. Similarly, I find that the 
respondent weighed its options with the complainant's best interests in mind. 
Whether the decision is ultimately proved right or wrong, I consider that the respondent 
made its decision based upon the evidence available and with the complainant's best 
interests at the forefront of its considerations. (M1 [2006] [49]-[51]) 
The Tribunal found that M had not been the subject of direct discrimination on the basis of 
age because the fact that she had not completed all the Year 7 Key Learning Outcomes in 
her time in the primary school was considered a valid reason for non-admittance to the high 
school. This successful completion of learning outcomes was indicated by implication as a 
requirement for all students. However, as Queensland, like other Australian States, does not 
retain students on the basis of academic performance, but follows the educational principle 
of ‘social promotion’, this in itself is a challengeable statement and assumption. 
The challenge by the plaintiff of indirect discrimination, that M was being expected to 
conform to a requirement of demonstration of social and emotional maturity, was also 
dismissed, as part of the case that M and her mother presented was that she was 
sufficiently emotionally mature to attend secondary school. 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in Queensland. After the complainant had 
successfully completed a semester at her independent high school, the education 
department was again approached to consider enrolling her at her local State high school 
and again refused. The allegation of the complainant before the Supreme Court was that the 
failure of the department to take the complainant's high school report into account in its 
continued refusal to offer her a full time high school placement was evidence of direct 
discrimination which had not been considered by the Tribunal at first instance. The appeal 
was allowed on this point and the complaint remitted to the Tribunal for further hearing 
and consideration of the evidence provided in the high school results and report that was 
indicative of M's capacity to study successfully in high school. 
Upon further appeal by Education Queensland to the Court of Appeal, however, the original 
Tribunal finding that there had been no discrimination was restored: 
[T]he Tribunal rejected the respondent's case on the basis of the Tribunal's view of the facts 
of the case. The respondent's case was that she had achieved the social and emotional 
maturity of a child in year 8. The Tribunal was correct to conclude that the respondent had 
not been required to comply with a term with which she was not able to comply: the 
respondent's own case was that she was indeed able to comply with this term. Accordingly, 
the case of indirect discrimination advanced by the respondent was bound to fail. In short, 
the respondent's only arguable case of discrimination was her case of direct discrimination, 
and that case failed because Mr Griffin's evidence of the respondent's educational 
attainments was preferred to the evidence of the respondent's mother. (MalaxEtxebarria v 
State of Queensland (M2) [2007] QCA 132 [34]) 
The Court of Appeal held that Helman J, of the Supreme Court, had been influenced in his 
decision by a mistaken belief that the education department had been made aware of the 
high school report and had nevertheless persisted in adhering to the view that the 
complainant was not sufficiently mature to be enrolled at high school. The facts were, 
rather, that the department had not been made aware of the reports. As such, their failure 
to act upon them could not be construed as potentially discriminatory against the plaintiff: 
[T]he Department's response cannot be characterised as discriminatory by reference to the 
effect of information with which they had not been provided. His Honour erred in thinking 
that the appellant's officers response to the respondent's request for acceleration, in fact, 
included an arguably erroneous rejection of relevant information provided by the report. 
There was no other basis on which to think that a decision by the Department not to 
reconsider its earlier decision was unlawfully discriminatory. As a result, his Honour was in 
error in holding that there was an arguable case of discrimination post June 2004 with which 
the Tribunal had failed to deal. (M2 [49], Williams JA) 
Although it is interesting to speculate on whether the outcome of the case would had 
differed had the report been provided to the education department, it is likely that it would 
still have failed in that the Court of Appeal was impressed by the argument that the 
department was ‘authorised, and, indeed obliged’ ([53] (Williams JA), see also [121] (Lyons 
J)) to treat the complainant as it did by the terms of s.12 of the Education (General 
Provisions) Act 1986 (Qld) which required it to ‘take the respondent's age into account in 
their decision making’. Section 106 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) creates an 
exemption in respect of acts done in compliance with legislation existing prior to its 
enactment. 
The Education (General Provisons) Act 1986 (Qld) has, however, recently been replaced by 
the Education General Provisions Act 2006 (Qld). As the new act postdates the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), there will be no facility in the future to rely on the exemption 
in s.106. As such, it can be argued that the failure to accelerate a student may once again be 
raised as potentially discriminatory. 
Moreover, the complainant's case in Malaxetxebarria was compromised by the failure to 
prove sufficient knowledge of the educational attainment of the complainant by the 
respondent. The complainant was represented by her mother and the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that she may have had ‘difficulties’ in formulating the claim (M2 [51]). 
Williams JA cautioned, however, that the role of a court on appeal is not that of a ‘roving 
inquisitor under a duty to advise and report to complainants in relation to possible grounds 
of complaint’. The implication of this caution is, perhaps, that a skillfully formulated claim 
may have had better prospects of success. 
In the more usual type of challenge regarding assessment of learning needs, T v Department 
of Education (T) ([2003] TASADT 4), T's mother appealed a decision by the Anti-
Discrimination Officer who dismissed her complaint under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 
(Tas) that the Department of Education had not provided equal opportunity and adequate 
educational support for her son, and had suspended him from school over behavioural 
matters without due regard to his special educational needs. The child had been diagnosed 
as having ADD. The original claim was heard on the basis that it might provide evidence of 
both direct and indirect discrimination, the latter requirements by the educational provider 
that could be met by other students without ADD but not by T, because of his condition. 
Among the claims was a failure of the Department of Education to provide an adequate 
diagnosis of her son's disabilities: 
Following the line of reasoning set forth in the above authorities, the claim that the child 
was discriminated against by reason of his suspension could only succeed if another child 
without the disability would have been treated more favourably. (T [40]) 
The Tribunal found that the evidence was that T had been treated more leniently than other 
children. The documentation also showed that T had been assessed eight times by a range 
of specialists and an educational psychologist over a period of eight years. In addition to 
ADD, a nonverbal learning disorder was diagnosed. The quantity of assessment and support 
provided satisfied the Tribunal that diagnostic assessment had been provided and that the 
Commissioner's finding had been appropriate (T [43]). The adequacy of the assessment for 
guiding instructional intervention was not discussed. Again, as the above discussions of 
discrimination cases show, in some cases there is considerable engagement with the 
educational issues and a judgement of what is seen as reasonable support and provision by 
the authority or school. While the cases suggest it is not particularly difficult for an 
educational authority to defeat a claim of discrimination, the courts and tribunals do make 
judgements about how much action on the part of an authority might be enough. Apparent 
limited efforts to gain appropriate assessments, or to consider all assessment information as 
in M, could attract censure. 
The extent of appropriate diagnosis and assessment, and school and teacher responsibility, 
have been further raised in an Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) case, Chinchen v NSW 
Department of Education and Training (Chinchen) ([2006] NSWADT 180), where 
discrimination was alleged against a ‘gifted’ child, Rhys, on the basis of an undisclosed and, 
at the time, undiagnosed disability. While initial findings of discrimination were 
subsequently impugned,22 the facts of the case nevertheless set out a cautionary tale for 
educators. 
Rhys had a specific disability, affecting planning and fine motor skills (motor dyspraxia), but 
was also a gifted student. Upon enrolment at Seaforth Public School in 1999, before his 
learning disability had been diagnosed and on the basis of his ‘exceptional’ ability, Rhys was 
placed in an extension class. The school's principal ‘observed [Rhys] to be a bright student 
who appeared to lack motivation. He considered that the stimulating program of the class 
and the diligence and competency of the class teacher might act as a catalyst to increase 
what he perceived as Rhys's lack of motivation towards his schoolwork’. Owing to a failure 
to keep pace with the demands of the class, at the end of 1999 Rhys was reassigned to a 
mainstream class. The compelling inference to be drawn from the facts is that the school 
continued to see Rhys as ‘unmotivated’ and did not suspect or arrange tests for an 
underlying learning disability which might account for his problems with keeping pace with 
the work in the extension class. The school was not aware of an external expert's 
assessment of Rhys as both very abled and learning disabled. State policy identified that 
‘sound mechanisms for assessment within the school’ for students with learning difficulties 
are the responsibility of the Principal (Chinchen [34]). Nevertheless, and despite the 
evidence of his learning difficulties, the school had not had him assessed by a school 
counsellor, which may or may not have uncovered a learning disorder but, in any event, 
should have led to the seeking of more expert assistance. Staff at the school recognised with 
the ‘benefit of hindsight’ that such an assessment was appropriate in the circumstances: 
Ms Hawkes (Rhys's teacher in 1999) conceded that with the benefit of hindsight, she should 
have involved the school counsellor. She said that the counsellor would have guided her in 
what to do by suggesting the kinds of strategies that needed to be put in place for his 
disability. She said that she would not have perceived him as being lazy and unmotivated if 
she had known that he had a disability. She conceded in cross-examination that the expert 
in assessing learning difficulties was the school counsellor. (Chinchen [48]) 
After agitation by his parents, Rhys rejoined the extension class at the end of 2000. 
However, his parents, on behalf of Rhys, made several claims of discrimination arising out of 
Rhys's treatment and class placement at Seaforth Public School. 
At first instance the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSWADT) noted 
that: 
[i]t is clear that teachers do not have the expertise and training to diagnose motor 
dyspraxia. Nonetheless, in accordance with the Respondent's policies, they have a 
responsibility to ensure that students are educated to their full potential and to be alert to 
any learning difficulties which might inhibit this. Ms Hawkes agreed with the proposition 
suggested to her in cross-examination that she expected parents to ‘place faith in the 
school's ability to identify, assess and manage difficulties in learning’. 
We are satisfied that in 1999 the characteristics of Rhys's disability … were evident to Ms 
Hawkes and Mr Ogilvie. The characteristic, difficulty completing tasks under a time 
constraint, is of particular significance. It was clear to the School that although Rhys was 
experiencing difficulty completing tasks in class, none of the strategies introduced by Ms 
Hawkes had proved effective. In these circumstances, the School had a responsibility to 
investigate the matter further by seeking the intervention of the school counsellor. If this 
could not have been done within a reasonable timeframe, steps should have been taken to 
advise the Chinchens of the need to seek appropriate expert assistance outside the School. 
(Chinchen [193]–[194]) 
While the NSWADT dismissed several allegations of discrimination or victimisation, three 
counts of discrimination and detriment were upheld. Most notably, regarding educational 
assessment, the Tribunal found that the school failed to provide access to the school 
counsellor for a full assessment, and that this was denial of a benefit to the detriment of the 
child (Chinchen [303]).23  
The findings of the NSWADT were appealed and the discrimination claim was subsequently 
abandoned by the Chinchen family and the matter settled before the appeal could be heard. 
Upon consenting to the settlement, the appeal Tribunal noted that the parties had agreed 
that the hearing Tribunal had erred in the comparison made for the purpose of determining 
whether there had been less favourable treatment. It had: 
failed to determine the proper circumstances in which to compare the treatment accorded 
to Rhys and the treatment accorded to a hypothetical student without motor dyspraxia and 
thereby failed to determine that Rhys Chinchen was treated less favourably than another 
student without motor dyspraxia in the same or similar circumstances. (Chinchen [5]) 
It is controversial but, nonetheless, settled law in Australia that the ‘proper circumstances in 
which to compare the treatment’ must be ascertained according to the approach articulated 
by the High Court of Australia in Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of 
Education and Training) ([2003] 217 CLR 92). On this approach, the comparator used for 
determining whether there has been less favourable treatment must be given the same 
‘manifestations’ of disability as the complainant. Although the reasoning is not fully 
developed in the appeal decision, a proper application of the Purvis approach to the facts of 
Chinchen would suggest that the treatment of Rhys should have been compared with the 
treatment of another student without his learning disorder but with his difficulty in keeping 
up with the tasks in class. Such a difficulty might arise, for example, not only from a learning 
disorder but also from inattention or wilful misbehaviour or, as suspected in Rhys's case, 
‘lack of motivation’. If the State could then have shown that an under-performing 
comparator without a learning disorder would also not have been tested, then there would 
be no less favourable treatment. Upon this analysis, the Purvis approach can be seen to 
have significantly eroded the opportunities available to students with disabilities. It could be 
argued, and the hearing Tribunal has been noted as accepting such an argument, that 
educators are in a position to recognise the symptoms of a learning disorder such as that 
displayed by Rhys Chinchen, and, further, may reasonably be expected in such a case to 
seek expert guidance and intervention so as to minimise any detriment to the learning 
opportunities of the affected student (Chinchen [193]). Indeed, evidence was presented to 
the hearing Tribunal that it was acknowledged in NSW Education Department policy 
documents that ‘government schools have a responsibility to identify their gifted students’ 
and to be alert to and prepared to intervene in respect of learning disorders which ‘may 
inhibit the expression of giftedness’ (Chinchen [36]). 
Like the Malaxetxebarria case, the Chinchen case too was carried by the parents without the 
benefit of expert legal representation. It would be overstating the effect, perhaps, of the 
ultimate demise of their case to argue that such a case could never succeed. Although there 
is no education case on point, recent employment discrimination law suggests that 
complainants may succeed in indirect discrimination claims when direct discrimination 
claims fail because of the problematic comparison authorised by the Purvis case.24 It is 
interesting to speculate about whether the failure to assess aspects of the Chinchen case 
may have succeeded if re-formulated as an indirect discrimination case.25 It could have 
been argued that a ‘term’ was imposed on Rhys that he ‘keep up’ in the extension class. He 
could not comply with this term because of his learning disability. Others without his 
disability could comply. The contentious issue to be resolved would be whether such a term 
is ‘reasonable’. In the context of the Tribunal's criticism of the failure of the school to test 
Rhys, it is, perhaps, likely that the term would not be found to be reasonable. 
 
 
Equity and the setting of assessment standards 
Recently, policy developments in Australia and internationally have created school 
improvement reforms led through accountability agendas, usually based on student 
achievement targets and standards. Two areas of legal challenge have been mounted in the 
area of standards that concern equitable assessment: the setting of appropriate standards 
for all students, and the setting of standards for individual students. 
Appropriate standards for all students 
Two Australian cases demonstrate challenges that may occur when standards are not 
appropriate for all students. In State of Victoria v Bacon & Ors (Bacon) ([1998] VICSC 58) and 
Bolton v State of Victoria (Bolton) ([1997] VADT 12), two groups of special needs students 
challenged age-based legislation introduced in Victoria in 1996. In Bacon the Victorian 
Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously rejected an appeal by the State of Victoria, following 
a single judge hearing in the Supreme Court on referral from the Anti-Discrimination 
Tribunal. 
The basis for the original challenge was the introduction of a requirement by the Victorian 
government that funding would be withdrawn from schools for children over 18 years of 
age ‘unless the student was formally enrolled in the Victorian Certificate of Education 
course (the VCE)’. This course, and its attendant assessment requirements, was unsuited to 
students with mild intellectual impairment who were participating in an 18+ Transition 
Programme at a school. The challenge was that the introduced requirement of enrolment in 
such a course to remain in school past 18 years of age was indirect discrimination under s 
9(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic),26 as such students would not be able to 
comply with the requirement on the basis of their learning impairment and therefore would 
not be able to continue in their present schooling, and that, further, the new requirement 
based on age had both a direct and indirect discriminatory effect in contravention of the 
Act. 
To satisfy the legal requirements for such a challenge, the applicants had to satisfy the Court 
that ‘a higher proportion of people without that attribute do or can comply with the 
requirement or condition’ and that such a condition was not reasonable on the part of the 
authority. The original hearing found that such a case had been established, and orders 
made were that the students should be able to return to school and that the 18+ Transition 
Programme in which they had been enrolled should continue to be offered. The Victorian 
Department of Education appealed on the basis of ‘six errors of law’, including the failure of 
the Court to consider the policy surrounding the introduced requirement, and that such 
policy made the requirement reasonable. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the 
Department of Education, finding no error on the part of the trial judge, although not 
supporting the finding of direct discrimination on the basis of age, as all those over 18 years 
of age were not affected in the same way. The findings of indirect discrimination that the 
requirement was not reasonable were held. 
Bolton was conducted on a similar basis and the same discrimination grounds while Bacon 
was still under appeal, and was expedited, as Bacon had been, by the Victorian Equal 
Opportunity Commission to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal for hearing. The main 
difference was that by the time of the Bolton challenge (and nine others), the Victorian 
government had altered the age-based act with a new series of regulations. Regulation 2.4 
provided that: 
[a]ny person who is aged 18 years or over on 1 January in a particular year is not entitled in 
that year to be enrolled at or attend a Special State School or to attend or participate in any 
course of study offered, conducted or provided by a Special State School. (Bolton) 
However, 
[t]he new s.25(C) inserted into the Education Act confers discretion on a principal or a head 
teacher to refuse to enrol a student in the school or to allow a student to attend or to 
participate in a program or to continue to attend or participate if the student is over a 
relevant age requirement specified in the regulations … S.25(C)(1) and the regulations 
combined authorise in my view the exclusion of students who are over the age 
requirements but there is a discretion granted, this is not a prohibition. (Bolton) 
The President of the Tribunal noted of this new insertion that ‘… while it might be exercised 
to exclude people on the ground of age simpliciter, (it) does not seem to me that it ought be 
exercised to exclude persons where the exclusion would also amount to discrimination on 
the ground of impairment’. Therefore, the new inclusion would remove the class 
discrimination based on impairment of the previous act. However, as the Bolton challenge 
was brought in time before enactment of the legislative changes, similar orders to those in 
Bacon were made. Thus, however, can the courts consider the same circumstances under 
different statutory obligations and find that equity matters have not been compromised. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined issues in assessment equity from the perspective of law. While 
these cases are Australian cases that have been considered under discrimination and 
disability law, and statutory obligations of education providers, the cases show that such 
law can still encompass a range of applications—beyond the provision of appropriate 
accommodations for students in formal or high-stakes assessments—to include diagnosis 
and placement and the provision of education at appropriate levels. The cases also show 
that the legal bar to prove discrimination, either direct or indirect, is high. The burden is 
definitely on the student to establish the complaint while, in some circumstances, a 
defending educational provider may argue that even a practice discriminatory on the face is 
reasonable on policy grounds. 
The courts in Australia demonstrate the same reluctance as courts around the world to 
engage in policy matters in education. Further, authorities, despite creating the policies that 
endorse equitable principles in education, will always challenge a student's complaint, often 
vigorously, and usually appeal a finding against them. The authorities often have far greater 
financial resources than the individual. 
However, the courts do require that education providers adhere to the requirements of 
legislation such as the various anti-discrimination policies. Hence, those putting in place 
policy developments or dealing directly with students should be aware of all such legislation 
and seek guidance as to their responsibilities in various circumstances. Schools, training 
institutions and teachers should be careful in their day-to-day dealings with students to 
ensure that assessment requirements are not inadvertently, even if not of sufficiently high 
stakes to be legally challenged, discriminatory to students.27 Care should be taken when 
diagnosing student learning and placement needs, using specialist support available. As the 
cases show, it is better to err on the side of caution when assessing an individual student's 
learning needs than to assume that matters can be handled within a school and by a 
classroom teacher. The diversity of student circumstances, including social and emotional 
factors, as well as more obvious physical factors, need to be considered when planning 
programmes of assessment. 
As we have noted, at present most legal consideration under statute law is of challenges by 
those with protected attributes or classes identified under the laws. We have yet to reach 
an educational state that is equitable for all, reflecting the principle that ‘all young 
people … have a right to gain an education that meets their needs’,28 and, we add, to learn 
and to demonstrate their achievements in the most positive and enabling manner. Students 
in the United States with special needs have access to a free, appropriate, public education 
in a least restrictive environment. This perhaps is the goal for equity in education and 
educational assessment for all. 
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